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Overview
• Presentation drawn from an evolving paper, Meade (2008):
Demarcating Electricity Sector Regulation and Competition Policy 
over Time: The Efficiency of Institutional Change
• Begin with stylised characterisations of:
– Competition Authorities (CAs)
– Regulatory Authorities (RAs)
• Briefly set out factors affecting demarcation between CAs and RAs 
Æ the Competition-Regulation (Comp-Reg) Boundary
• Apply the ideas to New Zealand’s electricity sector reforms
• Not offering a simple prescription re the appropriate boundary – 
focus is on how institutions can affect it settling in a good place
Competition Authorities
• Created to protect competition for benefit of consumers 
(often as a key component of liberalisation)
• General sector coverage, limited brief, and mainly 
economic/legal skills
• Often have history/precedent to call on, and 
independence
• Discrete, ex post intervention – enforcing existing laws 
against firms’ past actions (except merger clearances)
• Prefer structural remedies over behavioural (e.g. 
breakup)
• Permanent (no sunsets)
Regulatory Authorities
• Often set up for distributional/social objectives, or as substitute 
for competition when competition is not workable – e.g. arising as 
consequence of liberalisation
• But sometimes created to preclude competition or do so 
unintentionally (triggers for liberalisation/RA reform) Æ pro 
consumer focus not necessarily a given
• Sector specific, wide brief, ex ante rule-making, and ongoing 
monitoring/control (though perhaps with sunsets/reviews) Æ can 
give rise to inflexibilities/uncertainties
• Can have sector skills/information, lack of history/precedent/ 
independence, and can create new obligations (applying to firms’ 
subsequent actions)
• Prefer behavioural remedies over structural (e.g. CPI-X)
Factors Affecting Demarcation
• Easy, it seems:
– CAs are good at things that are more generalist, sporadic, ex 
post, less information-intensive, efficiency-oriented, … (i.e. 
competition policy)
– RAs are good at things that are more specialist, ongoing, ex 
ante, multi-objective, information-intensive, distributional, … 
(i.e. regulation)
• Though sometimes it may be better for CAs to do RAs’ 
jobs if “time consistency” (i.e. regulatory opportunism) is 
a problem – as it will be for industries with large, long- 
lived and sunk investments
• More interestingly, how do we explain changes in the 
Comp-Reg boundary over time …
Demarcation Factors – cont’d
• Is a question about institutional change:
Aoki (2004): Institution = self-sustaining shared belief
• Some causes of institutional change:
– Exogenous – e.g. “shocks”, or “focusing events”, such as:
• Technology – e.g. advent of mobile telecommunications, or a D-shackle 
failure at a major substation
• Weather – e.g. winter power crisis
– Endogenous – e.g. political and economic entrepreneurs, balancing 
interests of “veto players”, learning (e.g. L&E, regulatory models), …
• So in thinking about how the Comp-Reg boundary evolves, 
we must consider the factors either enhancing or reducing the 
purview of both competition policy and regulation
Pre-Liberalisation Regulatory Era Post-Regulatory Era
Demarcation Factors – cont’d
Welfare state 
model, with old 
school regulation 
and government 
taking lead role in 
economy
Post-liberalisation, 
replacing old 
school regulation 
with economic 
regulation
Shift away from 
imposed rules to 
hybrid of hard/soft 
law and mix of 
self-/state- 
governance
• To keep things manageable, have adapted the Scott (2004) scheme 
to define three stylised regulatory epochs:
Time
Demarcation Factors – cont’d
• Assert that Pre-liberalisation:
– Old school regulation was the natural state of affairs
– Competition policy and economic regulation were superfluous
• Further assert that after this era:
– Competition policy became the natural state of affairs, being 
required to support a move towards competition and market- 
based economic organisation (and trade reform, etc)
– Economic regulation of some sort replaced old school 
regulation
• Implies that tracking the Comp-Reg boundary, post- 
liberalisation, requires particular regard to the rise and 
fall of economic regulation, taking competition policy 
as given
Pre-Liberalisation Regulatory Era Post-Regulatory Era
Adding the Comp-Reg Boundary
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Old School Regulation
Economic Regulation
Competition Policy
Evolving Comp-Reg 
Boundary
Liberalisation/
Re-Regulation
Regulatory decline and/or rise 
of alternative governance forms
The Rise and Fall of Regulation
• Aside from the allocation of tasks to CAs and RAs based on static 
comparative advantage, think about the institutions that support or 
undermine effective regulation
• Assume that regulation should only be around until workable competition 
develops
• If regulation “works”, then it will result in the advent of workable competition, 
and can therefore decline in favour of competition policy alone Æ will 
generally require private investment to occur
• If not, then, absent other innovations affecting competition (e.g. technology 
change), regulation must either:
– Persist – i.e. adapt or grow until it does work (stay in the regulatory era), OR
– Be displaced or even replaced by some other approach (transition to the post- 
regulatory era, or even reversion to pre-liberalisation arrangements)
• Aside - even if regulation does work, does this mean regulators will “let go” 
(questions of inertia and creep)? Æ argues in favour of multi-sector 
regulators, or CAs as regulators, all other things being equal
Rise and Fall of Regulation – cont’d
• Literature focuses on the “time consistency” of regulation, which 
either supports or undermines efficient investment in regulated 
sectors Æ a.k.a. credible regulatory commitments
• Turns out the problems are more acute for regulation than they are 
for monetary policy, and more so where assets are long-lived and 
demand is growing slowly (more so for electricity than telecomms)
• Levy and Spiller (1994) highlight the role of institutions (“regulatory 
governance”) in providing the right balance between regulatory 
“discretion” and “commitment” – with three key mechanisms:
– Restraints on regulatory discretion
– Restraints on changing the regulatory system itself
– Institutions for enforcing these restraints
• “Institutional endowments” and “veto players” play a key role in 
determining whether effective regulatory governance can arise, or 
whether regulation fails (e.g. in favour of state ownership, or …)
Rise and Fall of Regulation – cont’d
• Thus countries like the UK – which suffer from a strong 
executive but have a tradition of respecting property rights, a 
strong judiciary and an independent civil service – can 
implement mechanisms such as regulatory contracts 
(“licenses”) to provide the required balance
• Others – like the US and Germany – have strong checks and 
balances (e.g. federalism, separation of powers): these can 
provide Levy and Spiller’s three mechanisms, but also impede 
reform
• France – has some institutions favouring effective regulation, 
but strong public service orientation impedes liberalisation
• One size does not fit all, and having a certain mix of 
institutions does not dictate any given approach (e.g. path 
dependence matters too)
Getting to the Post-Regulatory Era
• A number of models exist demonstrating that the right governance 
mix can mean regulation may not be necessary even for natural 
monopolies:
– Littlechild (2008) – “negotiated settlements” between suppliers and 
consumer representatives for US and Canadian electricity grids and gas 
pipelines
– Glachant et al. (2008) – German electricity sector “Association 
Agreements” between producers, and major users plus the German 
business association
– Meade (2005) – NZ and US customer ownership of unregulated lines 
companies (and ownership of G+T co-ops by US lines co-ops)
• Importantly, such models side-step regulatory time inconsistency by 
internalising the costs of opportunism to customers
• So the real question in tweaking regulatory setups may be whether 
such alternatives beat regulation in addressing market power? 
(recognising that regulators and regulated firms may have become 
“veto players”)
The New Zealand Case Study
• Apply these ideas to the New Zealand electricity 
sector reforms, highlighting key:
– Institutional endowments
– “Focusing events” giving rise to institutional change, 
affecting:
 Quality of regulatory governance
 The Comp-Reg boundary itself
• Track key phases (with emphasis on lines/grid):
– Muldoon-era pre-liberalisation
– Change to light-handed regulatory approach
– Introduction of heavier economic regulation
– Tweaks to economic regulation, including kernel of post- 
regulatory approaches
Key NZ Institutional Endowments
• Single chamber of parliament Æ strong executive able to act 
opportunistically (more so under FPP; less so under MMP even if incentive 
to do so is greater)
• Healthy tradition of protecting private property rights, though inflation and 
taxes historically expropriated wealth, and other notable interventions arise 
(e.g. EIRA, Foreshore and Seabed, Telecom unbundling)
• Strong judiciary with history of finding against government (e.g. Treaty 
cases in 1980s, Equiticorp), though loss of Privy Council appeals …
• Professional and fairly independent civil service, bolstered by 1980s 
reforms, though repoliticised to some degree over past decade
• Vetoes in electricity – Comalco contracts, privately-owned lines/retailing, 
private generators (especially Contact)
• Mixed bag for good regulatory governance, meaning:
– More regulation may arise than is efficient
– Regulation may not succeed, and thus perpetuate itself
Pre-Liberalisation Environment
• Textbook old school regulation, with no pro- 
competitive regulatory or competition law infrastructure 
Æ crowded out by strong industry policies
• Private ownership of lines/retail Æ veto players against 
radical reform (ESANZ as bulwark against 
government)
• Excess capacity yet blackouts Æ used to justify 
ongoing centralised control rather than to spur reform
• Muldoon as locus of power Æ independence and 
status of bureaucracy undermined, major veto player
• Self-sustaining institutional environment Æ big crisis 
needed to induce change …
Key Focusing Events
• 1984 election and currency crisis:
– Political and policy entrepreneurs took opportunity to liberalise
– Commerce Act 1986 and light-handed regulation (with threat of 
more) were two critical planks Æ blue turns yellow, red lowish
• Corporatisation and later, privatisation:
– Were intended to create strong veto players to constrain 
governmental discretion (i.e. the SOEs, and then their new 
owners) Æ got stuck half way 
– Means reform remains easier to achieve, but good regulatory 
governance less so
• 1992 failed Transpower “club” model Æ left grid business 
unfinished, hence open to later price controls
• Electricity Act 1992 removal of franchise areas Æ important 
part of deregulation (red falls)
Key Focusing Events – cont’d
• 1993 MMP referendum Æ some research suggests PR associated 
with lower quality regulation (Bertelli and Whitford (2005)), also all-
but killed privatisation as a commitment device, both negatives for 
regulatory governance
• 1996 Contact formation and privatisation, and 1999 final break-up of 
ECNZ Æ “de-regulation” of generation with degree of entrenchment
• 1998 EIRA, and 1999 failed introduction of price controls Æ
government signaled it is expropriatory, raising time inconsistency 
spectre and weakening regulatory governance (lines companies 
proved to be weak veto players, paving way for future regulation)
• 1999 election Æ political entrepreneurs took opportunity to make 
electricity governance an issue, leading in 2001 to Part 4A of the 
Commerce Act, and centralisation of industry control ultimately 
under a non-independent Electricity Commission (red jumps up)
Key Focusing Events – cont’d
• 2001 and 2003 power crises, combined with 2003 failure of industry to 
agree Electricity Governance Rules (key veto players prevail) Æ critical 
drivers of move to centralised industry governance, including EC approval 
of grid pricing policy and investment, plus reserve generation scheme (red 
jumps up)
• Regulatory chilling of lines investment (in face of replacement cliff) and 
2006 D-shackle grid failure at Otahuhu:
– Government asks Commerce Commission to place greater weight on investment 
incentives in price control decisions
– Extension of Commerce Act review to include Part 4A 
Æ red falls back?
• Commerce Amendment Act 2008 Æ raises jurisdictional uncertainty for 
lines and grid, but contains kernel of post-regulatory solutions:
– Exempts consumer-owned lines from price controls
– Introduces negotiate/arbitrate option
Æ red falls more? (for lines companies)
Summarising the New Zealand Story
Pre-Liberalisation Regulatory Era Post-Regulatory Era
Old School Regulation
Economic Regulation
Competition Policy
1984
Light-handed regulation
Part 4A introduced
Electricity Commission created
Investment prioritisation
Commerce Amendment Act
Future?
More reg’n despite 
weak governance
Reality & prag- 
matism bite?
Franchise areas removed
ECNZ broken up
Deregulatory phase
• NZ an early 
reformer and 
notably adopted 
LHR
• Late starter in 
heavier regulation
• Perhaps quickly 
getting to post- 
regulatory model?
Thank You – Any Questions?
